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This article is intended to provide insight into 
aspects of Ibn SąnĀ’s natural philosophy. It will 
summarize his interpretation of the Aristotelian 
four causes, explicate his theory of efficient and 
necessary causal linkage, and analyze his argu-
ments for causal efficacy. Finally, it will discuss 
Ibn SąnĀ’s views on chance happenings in nature.
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Few ideas in the history of philosophy in Islam have been so much debat-
ed, attacked, and defended as has the thesis that a necessary connection 
exists between cause and effect, that cause and effect are so inextricably 
linked that the existence of one necessitates and implies that of the other, 
and that if the cause has occurred, the effect cannot fail to occur. For in-
stance, it is this conception of causality, with its hidden assumptions and 
far-reaching ramifications (e.g. the fettering of God’s Will, the eternity of 
the world, the denial of the possibility of miracles, etc.), that prompted al-
GhazĀlą (d. 505/1111) to charge Ibn SąnĀ with heresy and infidelity. This 
article reexamines Ibn SąnĀ’s views on this crucial issue by looking first 
into his exposition of the four causes and his account of causal efficacy 
and necessity, before finally discussing his theory of chance. 
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1. The Four Causes
Ibn SąnĀ, like Aristotle,1 recognizes four kinds of causes, or rather four 
modes of explanation in the study of nature: (1) the efficient cause (Ăillah 
fĀĂiliyyah), namely, that which causes a thing to move or change and 
hence is dubbed the source or principle of motion and change (mabdaā al-
Ąarakah); (2) the material cause (Ăillah ĂunĆuriyyah), defined as that out of 
which a thing is generated, that in which change or motion is produced, 
and that which persists before, during, and after the process of change; 
(3) the formal cause (Ăillah ĆĈriyyah), that is, that into which something is 
changed or moved; this is the essence or ‘what it was for so-and-so to be’ 
of a thing; and (4) the final cause (Ăillah ghĀāiyyah), or that for the sake of 
which a change or motion is produced. 
Ibn SąnĀ takes these four causes as explanatory principles which are 
indispensable as a theoretical framework for the successful investigation of 
the natural world. This four-cause method of analysis is applied by him to 
natural bodies: everything that is generated and destructible, everything 
subject to change (li-kulli wĀqiĂ f ą al-Ąarakah), and everything composed of 
matter and form. For example, he says, a bed is produced by a carpenter 
(its efficient cause) by his imposing changes upon a block of wood (its 
material cause) for the purpose of possessing a piece of furniture on which 
to sleep (its final cause), the wood thereby acquiring the form, or certain 
distinctive properties, of a bed (its formal cause).2 
While he admits that the ancient philosophers utilized all these four 
explanatory principles, Ibn SąnĀ criticizes them for emphasizing some of 
the causes to the neglect of other equally, perhaps even more important 
factors in explanation. Thus he laments that some of the early think-
ers were concerned too much with material causes, believing they could 
explain the natural world by discovering the basic matter out of which all 
things are made, such as water (for Thales), air (according to Anaximenes), 
or fire (in Heraclitus’ view). On the other hand, others, like Plato, often 
spoke as if the explanation of all things would be achieved simply by 
discovering their Forms, or formal causes. The concept of efficient cause 
did not emerge until the time of Empedocles, who postulated two motive 
forces, Love (maĄabbah) and Strife (ghalabah), to account for the various 
changes observed everywhere in the universe.3 
According to Ibn SąnĀ, the material cause is important inasmuch as 
it is the potential bearer (ĄĀmil) of form and insofar as it is the locus of 
change from potentiality to actuality. Every natural thing has a material 
cause that is subject to generation, be it through the change of attribute or 
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state (istiĄĀlah), by way of aggregation and combination (bi-Ąasab ijtimĀĂ wa 
tarkąb), or both by way of aggregation as well as change of state.4 
The formal cause is understood by Ibn SąnĀ as having a variety of 
meanings. This is because he says the term ‘form’ (ĆĈrah) can stand for: 
(1) essence (mĀhiyyah), which, when present in matter, transforms it into a 
species (nawĂ); (2) the species itself; (3) figure or shape (shakl); and (4) the 
reality (Ąaqąqah) of a thing. As for the final cause, Ibn SąnĀ defines it as 
the purpose for which the form is produced in matter, the purpose being 
either the Real Good (khayr Ąaqąqą) or a supposed good.5 
Ibn SąnĀ points out that the formal, efficient, and final causes may 
coincide in one thing. Consider, he says, the case of a human being: one 
is at the same time the efficient, formal and final cause of his child. In 
this case, though conceptually separable, the efficient cause (a man), the 
formal cause (manhood), and the final cause (to become a man) are collec-
tively embodied in the parent alone.6 It may also happen, Ibn SąnĀ adds 
without giving any example, that the four causes coalesce in one thing (wa 
qad yattafiqu an yajtamiĂa hĀdhihi al-asbĀb kulluhĀ li-shayā wĀĄid bi al-dhĀt), 
or that a thing has only two causal factors, the efficient and the final, as in 
the case of the separated Intelligences.7
Explaining the relation between the causes, Ibn SąnĀ asserts that in 
a sense the efficient cause or agent is a cause for the purpose (sabab li 
al-ghĀyah), since it makes the purpose exist (yuĄaĆĆil al-ghĀyah mawjĈdah). 
In yet another sense, the purpose is a cause for the agent, since it is precise-
ly for its sake that the agent does what it does, and without which the 
agent would not act. This is why if someone asks: “Why do you exercise?”, 
the correct reply would be: “To be healthy.” Similarly, if someone asks: 
“Why is it that you always look healthy?”, it would not be incorrect to say 
in reply: “Well, because I always exercise.” In that case, one is therefore 
the cause for the other. Ibn SąnĀ remarks, however, that this by no means 
implies that an agent is the cause for the being-purpose of a purpose 
(al-fĀĂil laysa Ăillatan li-ĆayrĈrat al-ghĀyah ghĀyah), nor does it mean that an 
agent is a cause for the essence (mĀhiyyah) of the purpose in itself. Rather, 
an agent is but a cause for the actual existence of the purpose’s essence in 
concrete things, since for Ibn SąnĀ the essence of a thing is distinct from 
its existence. By contrast, the purpose is a cause for the being-agent of an 
agent (al-ghĀyah Ăillah li-kawn al-fĀĂil fĀĂilan), a cause for its being a cause.8 
Each of these causes can be either essential (biāl-dhĀt) or accidental 
(biāl-Ăaraă), proximate (qarąb) or remote (baĂąd), specific (khĀĆĆ) or general 
(ĂĀmm), particular (juzāą) or universal (kullą), simple (basąć) or composite 
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(murakkab), potential (bi al-quwwah) or actual (bi al-fiĂl). An efficient cause 
is said to be essential if it acts as a principle for the essence of its act 
(mabdaā li-dhĀti dhĀlika al-fiĂl), as in the case of a physician when he gives 
treatment, or fire when it heats water. The accidental efficient cause may 
be any of the following: (1) that whose act eliminates the contrary which 
prevents its contrary and strengthens the other contrary, e.g. scammony,9 
which, when cooled, can ease yellow bile; (2) that whose act removes the 
obstacle that prevents a thing from acting naturally, such as anything that 
destroys the end or purpose of something by eliminating its supporting 
condition; (3) that whose act does not destroy its individuality, e.g. our 
saying that the doctor builds, by which we mean that being-a-builder is a 
subject for him, so that he builds not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar 
as he is a builder; (4) that whose natural or voluntary act is directed toward 
a certain end, whether achieved or not, like a falling stone that breaks 
upon hitting a reptile; or (5) that which in fact does not act at all, as in the 
case of chance happenings.10 The efficient and final causes are usually 
remote, while the formal and material causes are proximate. The proxi-
mate causes act without an intermediary, as in the case of motion of a part 
of the body by the muscles. By contrast, remote causes act by means of 
intermediaries, such as the motion of the parts of the body by the soul.11
In natural philosophy, says Ibn SąnĀ, by ‘efficient cause’ or ‘agent’ 
(al-fĀĂil) is meant “the principle of change (mabdaā al-Ąarakah) in something 
other than itself,” the term “change” here referring to “every passage in 
matter from potentiality to actuality” (kull khurĈj min quwwah ilĀ fiĂl f ą 
mĀddah). It is the principle which acts as a cause (sabab) or agent of change 
in natural things from one state to another. To anticipate a possible objec-
tion to this definition, Ibn SąnĀ hastens to emphasize the difference of 
cause and effect, adding the phrase “by way of its [i.e., the effect’s] being 
other [than the cause]” (min Ąaythu huwa Ākhar). Thus, for example, even 
the physician curing himself is also the principle of change ‘in another 
by being another’ (f ą Ākhar bi-annahu Ākhar)—for he is changing himself 
(by undergoing treatment) not insofar as he is a physician, but insofar as 
he is a patient.12 Ibn SąnĀ further distinguishes two aspects of efficient 
cause as the agent or principle of change. First, the principle or agent of 
change may be regarded as ‘that which prepares’ (muhayyiā) and adjusts 
or modifies the matter of a thing so as to make it suitable for receiving 
a particular form—for example, that which causes different changes in 
sperm. Second, an agent of change or efficient cause may be seen as ‘that 
which brings to completion’ (mutammim) the whole change by giving to 
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each thing the form it deserves.13 
2. Efficient Causality
Unlike Aristotle, however, Ibn SąnĀ classifies the four causes into the “es-
sential” and the “ontological”. By ‘essential causes’ (ĂillatĀ al-mĀhiyyah) he 
means those which constitute the essence of a thing —namely, its mate-
rial and formal causes, whereas by ‘ontological causes’ (ĂillatĀ al-wujĈd) he 
means those which bring the thing into actual existence—namely, its ef-
ficient and final causes.14 This holds true of natural things whose essences 
are distinct from their existences, in contrast to the Necessary Being (i.e., 
God) whose essence is identical with His existence. Ibn SąnĀ also goes 
beyond the ‘First Teacher’ by expanding the concept of efficient cause in 
order to fit his own metaphysical system. Whereas for Aristotle the effi-
cient cause refers to that which produces motion or change in something 
already existing (since for him coming to be and passing away is always 
from and into something, and never ex nihilo), Ibn SąnĀ gives a deeper and 
far more fundamental meaning of efficient cause, taking it as the cause of 
existence. As he put it in the Physics of his ShifĀā:
If, however, the efficient cause is taken, not in relation to natural 
things, but in relation to existence itself (bi-Ąasab al-wujĈd nafsi-
hi), it would then constitute a meaning more general than this 
[i.e. as used in natural philosophy]. Consequently, everything 
which is a cause of an existence different from itself becomes—
inasmuch as it is different and inasmuch as the new existence is 
not for the sake of the former—an efficient cause.15
He points out that whereas in natural philosophy the efficient cause 
or principle common to natural things is identified as “nature” (al-mabdaā 
al-fĀĂilą al-mushtarak li al-ćabąĂiyyĀt huwa al-ćabąĂah),16 which in the case of 
living beings or animals is called ‘soul’ (nafs), in metaphysics the efficient 
cause is posited as the principal source of existence (mabdaā al-wujĈd). And 
whereas the role of the efficient cause in natural philosophy is confined to 
that of producing change in things and to being the principle or cause of 
motion and rest, for the metaphysicians like Ibn SąnĀ the efficient cause is 
the one responsible for producing existence and maintaining it, apart from 
causing change and motion. As he explains, by the term ‘agent’ (fĀĂil) he 
means the cause which bestows existence on things, as something ‘super-
added’, as it were, to the thing’s essence (allatą tufądu wujĈdan mubĀyinan 
li-dhĀtihĀ): “The metaphysicians (al-falĀsifah al-ilĀhiyyĈn) do not mean by 
‘agent’ only ‘the principle of motion or change’ (mabda’ al-taĄrąk), as do the 
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natural philosophers, but rather they mean ‘the principle and bestower 
of existence’ (mabdaā al-wujĈd wa mufąduhu) as in the case of God with 
respect to the universe.”17 
3. Two Principles of Causality and Their Corollaries
At the heart of Ibn SąnĀ’s theory of causality therefore lies the notion of 
bringing into existence (ąjĀd). For him, the efficient cause does not merely 
produce change and motion in its effect; it brings the latter into existence, 
renders it actual, putting an end to the latter’s potentiality. Indeed, Ibn 
SąnĀ weaves his physical theories into his metaphysics, in order to lay a 
solid rational foundation for religion. It is on the basis of his assertions 
about the necessary connection between cause and effect that he develops 
his proof for God’s existence and the eternity of the world. We shall now 
proceed to extract the main principles of causality from Ibn SąnĀ’s phi-
losophy. 
As we know, Ibn SąnĀ classifies things “considered in terms of what 
they are in themselves (idhĀ uĂtubira bi-dhĀtihi)” into three, namely: (1) 
that whose existence is necessary; (2) that whose existence is merely possi-
ble or contingent; and (3) that whose existence is totally impossible. The 
last he rules out because the impossible cannot exist without no longer 
being impossible. Left with the other two categories, he advances that if 
anything is (literally: if anything enters existence (tadkhul f ą al-wujĈd) then 
it would have to be either something whose existence is in itself necessary 
or in itself is only possible. Now, (1) if its existence is necessary in itself, 
then such a being cannot be caused, for otherwise it would be necessary 
through something else and not by itself. According to Ibn SąnĀ, such a 
being (whose existence is necessary by itself and independent of any cause) 
would have to be numerically one, the only such being, simple and change-
less. (2) On the other hand, if the thing’s existence is in itself only possible, 
then, in terms of its own essence, it may and may not exist. For such a 
being is in need of some cause, whether to be or not to be (fa-wujĈduhu wa 
Ăadamuhu kilĀhumĀ bi-Ăillah), and hence is contingent. If such a contingent 
entity exists, then it must have been specified with existence rather than 
non-existence. Similarly, if it does not exist, this is because it has been 
specified with non-existence rather than existence—for the contingent’s 
own essence alone cannot account for this specification (takhĆąĆ). Thus, if 
the contingent exists, its existence is due to something extraneous which 
is its cause. By the same token, if it does not exist, then this is also due to 
something extraneous—in this case, the absence of the cause.18 With this 
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ontological analysis Ibn SąnĀ establishes the first principle of his causal 
theory, namely that everything contingent, if it ever exists, must have a 
cause and must be caused to exist by something other than itself.
The second principle of causality enunciated by Ibn SąnĀ states that 
everything contingent that is caused to exist is caused necessarily—that is, 
its existence is necessitated. His argument for this may be paraphrased as 
follows. Any contingent being that exists, though in itself is possible, must 
become necessary through its cause and with respect to it (yaĆąru wĀjiban 
bi al-Ăillah wa bi al-qiyĀs ilayhĀ). For otherwise—that is, if it remained possi-
ble with respect to its cause—then the fact of its existence rather than 
its non-existence cannot be explained. We would then have to suppose 
another cause and if again, in relation to it, it remains possible, then we 
would have to suppose yet another cause and so on ad infinitum. Even if we 
allow the possibility of the infinity of such causes, this will not explain the 
fact of the contingent’s existence; for it would remain possible, not only in 
terms of its own essence, but also in relation to all these infinite causes. 
However, given the assumption that the contingent exists, its existence 
can only be explained in terms of a cause that renders it necessary. Thus 
it becomes necessary through the cause and with respect to it.19 
According to the second principle, therefore, if the cause exists, all 
other conditions being fulfilled, the effect must exist necessarily. This 
means that, on Ibn SąnĀ’s view, the connection which exists between (an 
efficient) cause and its effect is a necessary one. To say that the cause 
entails (lazima Ăanhu) and necessitates (wajaba Ăanhu) its effect is just 
another way of saying that the effect necessarily proceeds from the cause; 
that the effect must happen in case the cause exists; that once the cause 
exists—all other things being equal, that is, in normal circumstances—its 
characteristic effect must occur; and that the effect cannot fail to occur 
simply because it is compelled to occur by the very nature and power of 
the cause. If somehow the anticipated effect does not in fact occur, this 
does not mean that there is no such thing as necessary causal connection 
between the cause and its effect. Rather, it merely indicates that not all 
things were equal as had been supposed—that the condition ceteris paribus 
was not satisfied—as, for example, the cause may have been absent, misde-
scribed, or impeded by the efficacy of other causes.
It must be noted that when Ibn SąnĀ speaks of efficient cause as neces-
sitating the existence or occurrence of its effect, he is referring to the 
‘essential’ and ‘proximate’ cause (Ăilal dhĀtiyyah wa qarąbah), which alone 
are the ‘true cause’ (Ăilal bi al-Ąaqąqah or Ăilal Ąaqąqiyyah), in contrast to the 
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accidental cause (Ăilal bi al-Ăaraă) or the auxiliary and preparatory cause 
(Ăilal muĂąnah wa muĂiddah). He is insistent that the essential, true cause, 
and it alone, necessitates the occurrence of its effect and hence coexists 
with it, whereas the other two kinds of cause do not.20 This is implied in 
the phrase ‘bi al-dhĀt’ from which the adjective ‘dhĀtiyyah’ is derived. When 
applied to the term ‘cause,’ the phrase has two senses: first, the general 
one referring to the very thing which becomes the cause, and second, 
the specific sense that refers to the essence or nature of the agent thing, 
where the action is a consequence or effect of that essence. It is important 
to note further that, contrary to the widely held view, Ibn SąnĀ nonetheless 
acknowledges that empirical observation of regularities in nature does 
not prove the existence of necessary causal connection between natural 
things or events, and that regularities merely show that one is concomi-
tant with the other. However, he argues, there is a hidden syllogism to the 
effect that if this regularity were accidental or coincidental, it would not 
have continued to exist or occur ‘always or for the most part’ (dĀ’iman aw 
akthariyyan). From this he concludes that the regularity is indeed essential 
and due to the natural power inherent in the cause.21
Several corollaries follow from the two principles mentioned above. 
The first of these is that the (true, essential efficient) cause and its effect 
are coexistent (al-Ăilal al-Ąaqąqiyyah mawjĈdah maĂa al-maĂlĈl), which means 
that the relationship between the cause and its effect is not only coexten-
sive in the sense that what holds true of one is equally true of the other, 
but also reciprocal in the sense that the existence of one can be inferred 
from and implies the existence of the other (al-Ăillah musĀwiyah li al-maĂlĈl 
munĂakisah Ăalayhi). To put it in general terms, when the proper causal 
conditions obtain and no impediment intervenes, an agent or efficient 
cause not only produces its proper effect, but logically coexists with it. 
This holds true, however, only in cases where the cause is unique in 
relation to its effect (idhĀ kĀna al-maĂlĈl Ăillatuhu wĀĄidah)—that is, when 
it alone produces that particular effect.22 For when the same effect can be 
produced by any of several efficient causes or agents, the relation is no 
longer reciprocal, since no single cause can be inferred from the effect. 
The reciprocity relation is not restored until one element, common to 
the variety of possible causes, is identified and treated as the proximate 
cause or agent.23 Of course, this same reciprocity relationship between 
cause and effect may also be severed or interrupted by the intervention 
of various impediments. Yet according to Ibn SąnĀ, such exceptions to the 
unique and invariable character of causal necessity are mostly restricted 
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to a single domain, namely the world of generation and corruption (ĂĀlam 
al-kawn wa al-fasĀd). For in this realm the different natures of things 
result in frequent intersections between lines of causal influence so that 
the efficacy of some natural causes may be impeded by that of others, 
while non-natural causes, such as the human deliberative faculty, do not 
invariably produce one kind of effect in any case.24 Each of these counter-
instances, therefore, represents for Ibn SąnĀ the exception that proves the 
rule, for even the impediment impedes in keeping with its essential nature 
under appropriate causal conditions, while the deliberations and choices 
of human beings are likewise consistent with their own natures. 
Ibn SąnĀ does not say that the cause necessitates the occurrence of its 
effect without qualification. As he explains, the necessary relation between 
efficient causes and their effects may not obtain if the conditions peculiar 
to their natures are not met. In the sublunar, terrestrial world of gener-
ation and corruption, for instance, no less than six requirements must 
be fulfilled in order for effects to occur: (1) the (efficient) cause must be 
both proximate and specific; (2) the cause must represent the only kind of 
cause productive of a specific effect; (3) the cause must be essential as well 
as actual, while the effect must be in itself merely potential;25 (4) the cause 
must relate to the essence or nature of the (natural, involuntary) agent; 
(5) the recipient of the action must exist and must be properly disposed 
for the reception of the act;26 and finally (6) there must be no impedi-
ments.27 Of course, all these conditions are not always present. One should 
also consider the fact that the conditions of actuality (‘being-actual’) and 
necessity (‘being-necessary’) do not always combine. For example, the 
efficient cause may be a necessary condition (mimmĀ yĈjidu dhĀtan), but 
may not yet be actual (wa laysa baĂdu Ăillatan bi al-fiĂl), such as the wall being 
a necessary condition for the existence of the ceiling, but may not yet be 
actual.28 Also, a cause may be a sufficient (tĀmm) but not necessary (mĈjib) 
condition for the existence or occurrence of the effect; for the same effect 
may be produced by any one of a number of causes.29 
Another corollary is that the true efficient causes are always prior to 
their effects, ontologically if not temporally (since the two things or events 
may be contemporaneous or simultaneous, coexisting at the same time). 
That a cause must precede its effect ‘in existence’ is explicitly stated by Ibn 
SąnĀ in the Metaphysics of his ShifĀ’:
Thus, the existence of every effect is necessary in conjunction 
with the existence of its cause, while the existence of its cause 
necessitates the existence of the effect from it (wujĈdu kulli 
maĂlĈl wĀjib maĂa wujĈdi Ăillatihi, wa wujĈd Ăillatihi wĀjib Ăanhu 
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wujĈd al-maĂlĈl). Both occur together in time or in eternity [that 
is, temporally or eternally] or what have you, but not in relation 
to the attainment of existence [i.e., ontologically the two are 
not on a par]. This is because the existence of the one [i.e., the 
cause] did not come about from the existence of the other [i.e., 
the effect], for the occurrence of existence (ĄuĆĈl wujĈd) belong-
ing to the one does not derive from the occurrence of existence 
belonging to the other, whereas the occurrence of existence of 
this [effect] derives from the occurrence of existence of that 
[cause]. Therefore, one is prior [to that of the other] in relation 
to the attainment of existence.30 
Ibn SąnĀ distinguishes between two kinds of ontological priority. In 
one case the prior [i.e., the cause] is a necessary condition for the existence 
of the posterior [i.e., the effect], but does not necessitate the existence of 
the latter. For example, the number one is necessary for the existence 
of subsequent whole numbers but hardly necessitates that there are two, 
three, etc. of whatever we should like to count. In the second case, what is 
prior is both a necessary condition for the existence of the posterior and a 
factor which necessitates the latter’s existence as well. This kind of priority 
is represented by essential efficient causes as Ibn SąnĀ conceives them.31 
On this view, an essential efficient cause must be regarded as prior to its 
effect even though they are temporally coexistent. That is to say, the cause 
must exist prior to its effect; it must be there if the effect is to occur at all. 
This also means that while it is true that causes are said to necessitate the 
occurrence of their effects, the reverse is not true–there is no ‘backward 
causation.’ Of course, causes may either precede or coexist with their effects 
temporally; they may either occur successively (one preceding the other) 
or simultaneously (neither occurring before the other), in which case they 
are contemporaneous in the sense that there is never any real temporal 
succession or sequence such that one could distinguish between two things 
or events, which being the cause and which the effect, merely by asking 
which occurs first in time, since neither of them occurs first. Consider, for 
instance, the relationship between one’s hand and the key one is holding. 
The key will move whenever the hand moves, the movement of the key 
being caused by the hand’s movement, and not vice versa. There seems to 
be no temporal gap between the two movements—they move simultane-
ously, the movement of neither being followed by the movement of the 
other, such that it would be clearly false to say that the hand moves and 
then, after it stops moving, the key begins to move. Describing this second 
type of ontological priority, Ibn SąnĀ says:
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The mind is not repelled at all by our saying, “when Zayd moves 
his hand, the key moves,” or when we say, “Zayd moves his hand, 
then the key moves.” But it is repelled by our saying, “when 
the key moves, Zayd moves his hand,” even though the mind 
rightly says, “when the key moves, we know that Zayd moves 
his hand.” Thus, with respect to the temporal coexistence of 
the two movements, the mind assigns a priority to one and a 
posteriority to the other. For it is not the existence of the second 
movement that causes the existence of the first, but it is the first 
movement that causes the existence of the second.32
That the cause is ontologically prior to its effect further means that 
the latter depends upon it for existence and is necessitated by it. Against 
his own assertion, however, Ibn SąnĀ raises a possible objection: It might 
be argued that if each one of two things is such that if one exists, the other 
exists, and if one is removed, the other is removed, then one is not the 
cause and the other is not the effect, since neither one of them has a great-
er claim (awlĀ) than the other to be the cause with respect to existence.33 
It is obvious that the critic here is assumed as having taken Ibn SąnĀ at 
his word on the criteria of simultaneity and reciprocity in the implica-
tion of existence, which Ibn SąnĀ has asserted to exist between essential 
efficient causes and effects.34 But the critic uses them to deny that the 
so-called cause is ontologically prior to the effect. Neither one can have a 
greater claim on existence than the other, if they both arise together and 
disappear together. Indeed, it is so argued, their simultaneity connotes 
temporal coexistence, rather than priority of one to the other. Similarly, 
their mutual reciprocity connotes only an ontological association, so 
that wherever they are found, they are found together. But this does not 
justify any concept of ontological priority. While the opponent here is not 
identified, the character of his objection strongly suggests that Ibn SąnĀ 
is dealing with an occasionalist. For in attacking the notion of ontological 
priority in the second sense (which is both necessary and necessitating), 
Ibn SąnĀ clearly indicates his rejection of essential efficient causation itself. 
Ibn SąnĀ responds with a conceptual analysis of the various ways 
in which the “if” mentioned in the objection may be understood. The 
obvious aim behind this procedure is to answer the objection itself by 
clarifying the precise sense in which the coexistent cause is prior to the 
effect. To this end Ibn SąnĀ distinguishes between four senses in which 
the coexistence of cause and effect can be understood. The statement “if 
one exists, then the other must exist,” he argues, can mean either of the 
following: (1) if one (either cause or effect) has existed in external reali-
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ty (idhĀ ĄaĆala f ą al-wujĈd), then the other must consequently come into 
existence (yajibu Ăanhu an yaĄĆula) in external reality; (2) if one has existed 
in external reality, then the other must have already existed (qad ĄaĆala) in 
external reality; (3) if the existence of one has occurred in the mind, then 
the existence of the other must consequently occur to the mind; or (4) if 
the existence of one has occurred, then the existence of the other must 
have already occurred either in external reality or in the mind.35 
The first alternative is rejected, since it is true with regard to the 
cause, but false as regards the effect. For it is only the cause which is such 
that if it occurs then the occurrence of the other—after being possible—
follows necessarily from it, whereas the occurrence of the effect does not 
necessitate the occurrence of the cause. The second alternative is also 
rejected, since it is false both with regard to the cause and the effect. 
For as far as the cause is concerned, it is not true that if the cause exists, 
then the effect would have come into existence by itself or without the 
cause. Nor is it true as far the effect is concerned, because (i) the actual 
existence of the cause in external reality is not a necessary consequence 
of the effect, and (ii) because the actual existence of something which has 
already occurred cannot be necessitated by the occurrence of something 
supposed to be occurring—unless the word “occur” is understood other-
wise. Thus only the third alternative is entirely correct, since it is possible 
to say that “if the cause exists in the mind, it is logically necessary that 
the effect of which the former is its essential cause should exist in the 
mind,” and likewise “if the effect exists in the mind, then the cause too 
must exist in the mind.” As for the fourth alternative, only the first part 
of it (namely, if the existence of one has occurred, then the existence of 
the other must have already occurred in external reality) is true, while the 
other (i.e., if the existence of one has occurred, then the existence of the 
other must have already occurred in the mind) is false. It is true that if the 
effect exists, the mind testifies (shahida al-Ăaql) that the existence of the 
cause has occurred in external reality so that the effect has come to exist, 
although the existence of the cause might occur in the mind after that of 
the effect.36 From the correct alternative it follows that if the existence of 
either cause or effect in reality presents itself to the mind, the mind attests 
to or makes a necessary inference to the existence of the other, although 
the other may not be known or represented in the mind until long after-
ward. Speaking in psychological terms, his point is that in thinking of one 
we must ultimately think about the other, although he offers no reason 
why we should do so.
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In short, to say that the cause is ontologically prior to the effect simply 
means that the existence of the cause is necessary for the existence of the 
effect, and that the former necessarily results in the latter. Much of the 
same set of arguments applies to the removal of cause and effect from 
existence. On Ibn SąnĀ’s account, the removal of the effect is dependent 
upon and necessitated by the removal of the cause, but not vice versa. At 
most one could conclude from the removal of the effect that the cause has 
necessarily ceased to exist first. From these considerations, Ibn SąnĀ draws 
his conclusion as follows:
Let us return to the point where we drew this distinction, for 
we say in regard to the state of perplexity [which prompted the 
question] that it is not the conjunction (maĂiyyah) [of cause and 
effect] that necessitated causation for one of the two, so that 
it is [argued that] “one of them does not have a greater claim 
on causation than the other because, in terms of conjunction, 
they are on a par.” Rather, the two of them differ because we 
suppose in the case of one of them that its existence does not 
necessarily occur through the other, but with the other, while 
in the case of the second we suppose that just as its existence 
occurs with the existence of the other, it likewise exists through 
the other. Thus the question should be resolved in this way.37 
Two noteworthy points emerge from Ibn SąnĀ’s analysis. First, his 
defense of ontological priority as both necessary and necessitating depicts 
causes and effects as essentially discrete and rather static entities, which are 
related in various ways depending upon the sense and context assigned to 
each. There is nothing intrinsically active about the cause which is neces-
sary for a given effect and from which the effect necessarily follows. Like 
two links in a chain, we may say that they are connected but, to all appear-
ances, the links do not do anything. Second, Ibn SąnĀ does not clearly 
indicate whether he regards causes primarily as substances or as events or 
equally as both. His examples tend to include both. Although he seems 
inclined to regard causes as substantive agents, here the clear illustration 
he gives of a cause and its effect in discussing ontological priority—that of 
the movement of someone’s hand in turning a key—portrays the cause as 
an event (ĄĀdithah). This ambiguity cannot be ignored, since it is precisely 
these elements in Ibn SąnĀ’s account of causality that the theologians like 
al-GhazĀlą, who regard causes and effects strictly as events, have exploited 
to destroy and condemn his metaphysical system.38 
4. Chance and Luck
We now come to the opposite of causal necessity, namely chance (ittifĀq) 
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and luck (bakht). Ibn SąnĀ begins by reviewing and refuting the opinions 
of ancient thinkers on these issues. First, he tells us, there are some who 
reject the whole idea of chance and fortune, those who claim that every 
event has a definable cause and that everything that seems to occur by 
chance is really due to a determinate cause. According to them, only the 
fool would think it is by ‘good luck’ (al-bakht al-saĂąd) that someone found 
a treasure while digging a hole, much as it would be due to ‘bad luck’ (al-
bakht al-shaqąy) if he slipped and broke his leg. There is no such thing as 
luck, they argue. Thus if someone found a treasure it is because he had 
dug for it. Similarly, if, while digging for it, the person slipped, it is be-
cause he did not mind his step. Also, they further argue, when someone 
goes to the market for some purpose of his own and meets his debtor and 
then gets back his money, this cannot be due to luck either, but rather 
because he intentionally went to the place where his debtor was around, 
spotted him, and so was able to collect his money. Admittedly, they say, his 
going out to the market was not planned for the purpose of getting the 
money back, although it eventually had the same result as if so designed. 
For it is possible that an activity or event have several goals (yajĈz an yakĈn 
li-fiĂl wĀĄid ghĀyĀt shattĀ), but when either one of them is achieved, the rest 
are ignored.39 
Others have taken the totally opposite view, overestimating the role of 
chance and luck. Those who hold that luck is a divine cause (sabab ilĀhąy) 
and a hidden, mysterious power inscrutable to human intelligence have 
gone so far as to worship it like a deity, built it a temple and erect a statue 
dedicated to it. There are others who, like Democritus and his follow-
ers, regard luck as the most prevalent of all natural causes and hold that 
the whole universe is a spontaneous product of chance. They say that the 
fundamental constituents of everything are unsplittable corpuscles (ajrĀm 
ĆighĀr lĀ tatajazzaā). These so-called atoms or minimal parts are said to be 
numerically infinite, dispersed in an infinite void, having various shape 
and size, continuously in motion, and colliding with each other as they 
roam in the void, giving rise as luck would have it to the cosmic vortex 
out of which the universe came into being in its present order. They also 
hold that there are infinitely many universes similar to this one we live in. 
Finally, there are those who despite their denial of chance as the cause of 
the whole universe nevertheless maintain that natural things which are 
made of basic elements are produced or come to be by chance (al-kĀāinĀt 
mutakawwinah bi al-ittifĀq). Even continuation and reproduction of species 
are said to occur by chance.40
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Ibn SąnĀ next gives his own views, stating that things and events may 
be classified into: (1) ‘those which happen always’ or regularly (mĀ hiya 
dĀāimah or al-dĀāim); (2) ‘those which happen for the most part’ or usually 
(mĀ hiya f ą akthar al-amr or al-aktharą); (3) ‘those which seldom happen’ or 
rarely (mĀ yakĈnu fą aqall al-amr or al-aqallą); and (4) ‘those which happen 
as often as not’ or occasionally (mĀ yakĈnu bi al-tasĀwą or al-mutasĀwą). An 
example of the first category is the occurrence of burning when fire comes 
into contact with firewood, while events of the second category are such 
as the expected arrival of someone heading for some place at his destina-
tion upon leaving the house. Things or events which happen always or 
usually, Ibn SąnĀ tells us, do so either because the nature of the cause acts 
regularly (‘an iććirĀd f ą ćabąĂat al-sabab)—the act being necessitated by the 
very nature of the cause or agent—or because the cause needs no accom-
panying factor (qarąn aw sharąk), that is, when it is sufficient to produce 
the effect, or because there is no impediment. Events of the first catego-
ry are necessary (wĀjib) by virtue of the nature of the cause. But those 
belonging to the second category too, we are told, can become necessary 
“provided all impediments present are removed and potential obstruction 
prevented” (bi sharć daf Ă al-mawĀniĂ wa imĀćat al-ĂawĀriă). Ibn SąnĀ then 
concludes that things or events which always or usually occur cannot be 
due to chance or luck.41  
The last two categories to be considered relate to the things which 
happen as often as not or occasionally (lit. ‘equally’ = biāl-tasĀwą) and those 
which seldom occur. It is a problem whether or not what occurs equally is 
said to be so by chance. Ibn SąnĀ disagrees with the later peripatetics who 
said that the things which occur by chance are found among the things 
which occur rarely, and that the things which occur as often as not, like 
walking and not walking, eating and not eating, result from the thing’s 
principles, that is, from someone’s choice and decision to perform that 
action or not, and this cannot be called by chance. According to Ibn SąnĀ, 
however, it is possible that something may occur necessarily or usually 
(akthariyyan bal wĀjiban) from one point of view, and that it may occur as 
often as not or rarely from another viewpoint. For instance, the genera-
tion of a sixth finger seldom occurs, but it is necessary from the stand-
point of nature as a whole in which no matter should get lost, so that it 
is necessary that it receives the form it was prepared for. Therefore it is 
possible that something occurs as often as not from one point of view and 
usually from another point of view. If walking or eating is attributed to 
the will which decides whether or not this activity will take place, then it 
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usually occurs. But if it is regarded not as such but only insofar as it may or 
may not occur, then it may be said to occur as often as not and by chance. 
Thus it is correct to say: “When I entered his house, he just happened to 
be eating,” eating in that case being considered not from the point of view 
of the choice of the eating person, but from the point of view of the enter-
ing person, for whom it is by chance that the person in the house is eating 
(bi al-qiyĀs ilĀ al-dukhĈl lĀ ilĀ al-irĀdah).42 
 Ibn SąnĀ then concludes that something is said to happen by chance 
only if it is something which is unexpected (ghayr mutawaqqaĂ) and which 
neither always nor usually happens in the same way, provided it is chance 
or luck that leads to the thing’s occurrence (idhĀ kĀna min shaānihi an 
yuāaddiya ilayhi). Therefore, chance and luck are regarded as accidental 
causes. Consider, for example, the case of someone sitting at the moment 
of lunar eclipse. We cannot say that his sitting happens to be the cause 
of the eclipse, although it is correct to say that both events happen to 
coincide. The activity of sitting was not the (true, essential) cause of the 
eclipse, but rather was merely an accidental cause leading to the coinci-
dence or ‘happening together’ with the eclipse (al-kawn maĂa al-kusĈf), for 
‘occurring or being together with the eclipse’ is not an eclipse.43 To sum 
up, what happens by chance must therefore be something which occurs 
for the sake of something (min ajli shayā), whether it be according to choice 
or nature. Chance causes (asbĀb ittifĀqiyyah) are accidental; they can never 
necessitate the occurrence of something, neither always nor usually (laysa 
dĀāim al-ąjĀb wa lĀ akthariyya al-ąjĀb).44 Thus, chance events are those which 
happen otherwise—that is, other than always or usually. Chance causes 
operate in exceptional cases, when the four causes, the principles on 
which nature habitually works, appear to be absent. 
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